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Article 
Regulating Firearms Through Litigation 
PATRICK LUFF 
As a result of relatively weak regulation, firearm use leads to 
massive negative externalities.  Efforts to minimize these social costs 
via legislation have been unsuccessful, which have led individuals 
and government entities to seek regulation through another avenue: 
litigation.  This use of the courts as a regulatory gap-filler raises 
vital questions, among which perhaps the most vital is whether 
courts are effective at performing this role.  This Article seeks to 
answer that question by comparing the courts as an institution with 
other institutions, such as markets, legislatures, and administrative 
agencies.  I consider a number of factors that can be used to 
measure institutional effectiveness, and argue that courts are the 
optimal (albeit imperfect) institution for dealing with firearm-related 
externalities.  I then consider a number of remedies that could be 
used to address the firearm-related externalities, concluding that 
damage awards are appropriate to remedy these social costs, while 
at the same time creating market-based incentives to reduce future 
externalities.
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Regulating Firearms Through Litigation 
PATRICK LUFF* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is little—if any—regulation that seeks to account for the social 
costs associated with gun use.  For the most part, regulation of these social 
costs is merely a byproduct of crime-control legislation.  This regulatory 
vacuum has led both individuals and local governments to seek regulation 
through another avenue: litigation against the gun industry.1  Although the 
passage of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act in 2005 
limited the viability of such lawsuits,2 the damages this litigation sought 
could have significantly reduced firearm externalities.  First, the damage 
awards would have shifted some costs to producers and distributors, 
causing these parties to internalize the costs of firearm-related injuries.3  
Second, the internalization would have the subsidiary effect of deterring 
future costs by incentivizing producers to create safer products and to 
distribute them more responsibly.4  But for now, at least, the use of 
litigation as a means of regulating these costs has stalled. 
The potential use of courts as a means of regulating firearms raises two 
vital and related questions.  First, which institution—markets, legislatures, 
agencies, or courts—is the most effective at dealing with the regulatory 
problems firearms present?  Second, if courts are to play a regulatory role, 
under what circumstances is it legitimate for them to do so?  I have 
addressed the latter question in a previous article,5 and accordingly, this 
contribution focuses on answering the former question.   
I approach the question of which institution would be most effective at 
                                                                                                                          
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State 
University.  I owe my thanks to the participants in the Connecticut Law Review’s Symposium for their 
helpful comments. 
1 See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Litigation as Regulation: Firearms, in REGULATION 
THROUGH LITIGATION 67, 67 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (assessing the ways in which local 
government lawsuits against the gun industry have changed the relevant regulatory perspective); infra 
Part II.B.2 (discussing individual lawsuits against the gun industry). 
2 See Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 
(2012)) (prohibiting qualified civil liability actions from being brought against gun manufacturers in 
federal and state court); infra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra Part IV.A. 
4 See infra Part IV.A. 
5 See Patrick Luff, Captured Legislatures and Public-Interested Courts, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 519, 
552–53 (arguing that courts are legitimate policymakers when judicial decisions align more closely 
with the public interest when compared with legislative measures). 
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regulating firearms through a comparative institutional analysis.6  Rather 
than viewing courts, agencies, or markets in isolation, I compare the 
institutions based on a number of criteria that are necessary for effective 
regulation.  Accordingly, this Article builds on the work of Timothy 
Lytton7 and Peter Schuck,8 both of whom have undertaken comparative 
institutional analyses of firearms regulation.  My analysis, however, differs 
from these authors in a number of ways.   
First, Lytton’s methodology is to demonstrate the deficiencies of 
markets, legislatures, and agencies,9 but this comparative analysis is 
incomplete.  Although Lytton identifies weaknesses of these institutions 
that are not shared by the courts,10 he does not undertake a global 
comparison of these institutions based on their costs and benefits.  Schuck 
attempts to do precisely that by positing a number of general factors that 
are necessary for good regulation,11 and I follow his analysis to the extent 
that he identifies these indicia of good regulation.  My analysis diverges 
from Schuck’s in taking issue with a number of factors he identifies as 
necessary to effective regulation, at least with respect to regulation of 
firearms, and by disagreeing with many of his conclusions on the factors 
on which we agree.  Ultimately, in contrast with Schuck, I conclude that 
courts would be able to effectively deal with the main regulatory problems 
that firearms present.  Nevertheless, I recognize that for complicated 
regulatory problems, such as those presented by firearms, effective 
regulation must be multi-institutional. 
This Article proceeds in three subsequent parts.  In Part II, I discuss 
social costs and, relatedly, deterrence of social-cost creation as the main 
aims of firearms regulation.  Next, I discuss how two institutions—
                                                                                                                          
6 Cf. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 232–55 (1994) (exemplifying the judiciary as 
a singular institution with its respective tools to carry out the complex and multifaceted venture of 
constitutional interpretation). 
7 Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000). 
8 Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work, in SUING THE GUN 
INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 225 (Timothy D. 
Lytton ed., 2005). 
9 See Lytton, supra note 7, at 1249–54 (discussing the shortfalls of market, legislative, and 
administrative regulation in effectively controlling gun violence). 
10 See id. (noting that externalities permeate the gun market, that legislatures are easily influenced 
by the lobbying efforts of powerful minority interest groups, that administrative agencies tasked with 
regulating firearms lack resources, and that these agencies also are vulnerable to the influence of the 
gun industry). 
11 See Schuck, supra note 8, at 230 (“In order for an institution to make and implement policy 
effectively, it must (1) generate the technocratic information needed for gun-related policy-making; (2) 
generate the political information needed to frame an acceptable policy; (3) mobilize the array of 
different policy instruments necessary to establish and implement the policy; (4) promote social 
learning (short feedback loops) and flexible adaptation to new conditions; (5) generate predictable 
rules; and (6) secure and sustain the policy’s legitimacy.”). 
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legislatures and agencies on the one hand, and courts on the other—could 
deal with these problems, and whether they have done so in practice.  In 
Part III, I posit criteria for comparing these institutions as firearms 
regulators and then analyze the institutions based on those criteria.  In 
contrast to Schuck’s analysis, I conclude that courts could be effective 
firearm regulators.  Finally, in Part IV, I discuss the optimal responses of 
the institutions to the regulatory problems of firearms, arguing that courts 
are the institution best suited to regulate firearm-related social costs.  I then 
briefly discuss the complementary interaction between courts and markets 
in regulating the social costs of firearms, and the residual regulatory role of 
legislatures and agencies. 
II.  COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO FIREARMS 
A.  Firearms and Externalities 
An externality is a cost that is not reflected in the price of the good 
sold; neither the buyer nor the seller is the party who bears the cost, so the 
cost is external to the transaction.12  Many environmental regulations are 
justified on such grounds.13  Consider, for example, a factory where a 
byproduct of the production process is a harmful chemical.  The cheapest 
means of disposing of the chemical may be to dump it in the local river, 
but doing so might cause a variety of harms.  For example, fish might die 
in the polluted water, or the water may no longer be safe to drink.  Both of 
these results impose costs on the public, but fail to impose costs on the 
factory or the purchasers of the factory’s products.  In contrast, imagine 
that the EPA enforces a policy that prevents such dumping.14  Now, the 
factory has to dispose of the byproduct safely or face fines.  The factory 
will either have to pay for the disposal cost out of its profits or pass the 
cost on to the consumer in the form of higher prices.15  Thus, these costs 
would become internal to the transaction.  
Firearms create a number of negative externalities.16  In 2010, the use 
                                                                                                                          
12 See generally ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 35–38 
(1994) (discussing externalities).  
13 Cf. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23 (1982) (“A considerable amount of 
regulation is justified on the ground that the unregulated price of a good does not reflect the true cost to 
society of producing that good.”). 
14  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (2012) (prohibiting the discharge of chemical waste into 
navigable waters).   
15  Incidentally, the latter approach transmits some information to the consumer.  See infra Part 
IV.A. 
16 For the purposes of this Article, when I refer to “firearm-related externalities” or “social-costs,” 
I refer to negative externalities. 
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of firearms led to the loss of over one million years of potential life.17  On 
top of this, firearm-related injuries lead to significant healthcare costs,18 
and firearm violence generates substantial public safety costs.19  In total, 
firearms contribute to social costs of around $100 billion per year.20  While 
some of these costs are borne by gun owners, manufacturers, or 
distributors, the vast majority of these costs are borne by third parties.21  
Firearm-related injuries result in considerable productivity losses for the 
national economy as well as non-pecuniary harms that victims, and their 
families and friends, must suffer.  In addition, the medical costs of firearm-
related injuries are borne by private or, more commonly, public insurance 
schemes.22  In economic terms, these costs are negative externalities that 
affect neither the producer nor the consumer of the product.23 
B.  Comparative Institutional Responses to Firearm Regulation 
1.  Firearm Legislation 
Legislative efforts to regulate firearms generally take the form of 
command-and-control regulation, that is, regulation via “promulgation of 
legal rules prohibiting specified conduct, underpinned by coercive 
                                                                                                                          
17 Homicides resulted in the loss of 370,474 years of potential life before the age of 65, and 
suicide resulted in the loss of 344,232 years of potential life before the age of 65.  Years of Potential 
Life Lost (YPLL) Reports, 1999–2010, CDC, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/ypll10.html (under 
Advanced Options select “Specific Injury Category”; then select “Homicide”; then select “Firearm”; 
then click “Submit Request”; repeat steps but substitute “Suicide” for “Homicide”) (last visited Apr. 
15, 2014).  In the same year, unintentional deaths from firearms resulted in the loss of 17,973 years of 
life before the age of 65.  Id. (under Advanced Options select “Specific Injury Category”; then select 
“Unintentional”; then select “Firearm”; then click “Submit Request”).  If we use the low end of life 
expectancy in the United States, which is 75, the numbers change to 479,100 years lost to homicide by 
firearm, 507,244 years lost to suicide by firearm, and 23,653 years lost to unintentional firearm death, 
for a total loss of 1,009,997 years.  Id. (under Report Options, look to “Calculate YPLL Before Age” 
dropdown list and select “75”; repeat steps previously described in this footnote). 
18 The figure was almost $630 million in 2010.  EMBRY M. HOWELL & PETER ABRAHAM, URBAN 
INST, THE HOSPITAL COSTS OF FIREARM ASSAULTS 1, 4 (2013), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412894-The-Hospital-Costs-of-Firearm-Assaults.pdf. 
19 See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 7 (2002) (“[T]he cost 
of gun violence is not limited to the immediate damage but has broad consequences for peace of mind, 
private investment in protection and avoidance, and the expenditure of tax revenues.”). 
20 Id. at 115. 
21 See Lytton, supra note 7, at 1250 (“[T]he costs of gun violence fall heavily on victims who are 
not themselves gun consumers.”). 
22  Because the majority of firearm-related injuries are the result of intentional use, they will not be 
covered under private insurance schemes.  Peter Kochenburger, Liability Insurance and Gun Violence, 
46 CONN. L. REV. 1265, Part II.C (2014).  If neither Medicaid nor the individual responsible for the 
injury pay the medical costs, they will be borne by the treating facility, which will then pass these costs 
on to third parties through higher prices for medical care. 
23 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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sanctions . . . if the prohibition is violated.”24  Although states have also 
passed gun control measures, state laws can be ineffective because, unless 
there are uniform standards, weak gun controls in one state can undermine 
stronger gun control efforts in other states.25  Accordingly, this Subsection 
focuses on federal gun control laws. 
A number of statutes in the 1920s and 1930s constituted the first major 
national efforts to regulate firearms.  The first substantial statute was the 
Mailing Firearms Act of 1927.26  This Act prohibited the mailing of 
concealable firearms through the United States Postal Service,27 but its 
prohibitions could be evaded through the use of private express 
companies.28  A short time later, Congress enacted the National Firearms 
Act of 1934,29 which was intended to reduce gangster-style weapons30 and 
covered firearms like machine guns, silenced weapons, short-barreled 
rifles, and short-barreled shotguns.31  The Act taxed these items heavily 
and required them to be registered and bear serial numbers.32  Additionally, 
it required firearms dealers who sold these weapons to register and pay 
taxes.33  Next, Congress passed the Federal Firearms Act of 1938,34 which 
expanded licensing requirements for firearm manufacturers and dealers, as 
well as the definition of firearm.35  However, this Act was rendered 
relatively toothless because the criminal provisions of the bill, which made 
it illegal to sell stolen weapons or sell to convicted criminals and fugitives 
from justice, were altered to prohibit only those sales in which the seller 
knew or had reason to know that the buyer met those conditions.36  It was 
                                                                                                                          
24  BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND REGULATION 80 
(2007). 
25 See Michael de Leeuw, Let Us Talk Past Each Other for a While: A Brief Response to 
Professor Johnson, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1642–43 (2013) (describing “the relative ease and 
anonymity with which people can purchase handguns in one state and then transport them elsewhere to 
sell on the street”) 
26 Act of Feb. 8, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-583, 44 Stat. 1059 (1927) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1715 (2012)). 
27 Id. 
28 Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 133, 136 (1975).   
29 Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5849). 
30  See Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of U.S. v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 48, 61–63 
(2008) (discussing the legislative history of the National Firearms Act); see also Jana R. McCreary, 
“Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REV. 813, 832 (2013) (describing 
the National Firearms Act of 1934 as reactionary legislation that was enacted due to concerns about 
gangsters and organized crime). 
31 § 1, 48 Stat. at 1236. 
32 Id. §§ 3, 5(a), 8, 48 Stat. at 1237, 1238, 1239. 
33  Id. § 2(a), 48 Stat. at 1237.  
34  Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250, repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 906, 82 Stat. 197, 234 
(1968). 
35 Id. §§ 1(3), 3, 52 Stat. at 1250, 1251–52. 
36  79 CONG. REC. 11974 (1935). 
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almost impossible to achieve a conviction based on such language.37  
According to Robert Spitzer: 
From the 1930s to the 1960s, fewer than 100 arrests were 
made under the terms of this law.  In addition, the low 
licensing fee encouraged private citizens to acquire dealer 
licenses to obtain dealer benefits, such as lower prices.  
When dealer license fees were raised in the 1990s by the 
Brady Law, the number of dealers dropped precipitously.38 
It would be another thirty years before Congress passed another 
influential firearms law, which took the form of the Gun Control Act of 
1968.39  Originally only introduced to restrict mail-order firearm sales after 
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963,40 the Act finally 
passed in 1968 after the murders of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Senator 
Robert F. Kennedy.41  It expanded the meaning of “dealer” to cover more 
sales42 and required dealers to keep more records on the guns in 
circulation.43  It also prohibited private interstate sales and sales to minors, 
the mentally ill, and nonresidents of the state in which the dealer was 
located.44  Yet this too was a relatively limited Act—which was at least 
partially attributable to the involvement of firearm manufacturers, who 
were involved in drafting the legislation.45  The bill’s sponsor, Senator 
Thomas Dodd, was from Connecticut, the home of several firearm 
manufacturers,46 and the manufacturers sought to limit competition from 
small-scale operations that imported, modified, and sold military surplus.47 
In 1986, the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act48 amended the 1968 Act 
in a way that reflected both the country’s ideological turn to the right and 
                                                                                                                          
37  Carol Skalnik Leff & Mark H. Leff, The Politics of Ineffectiveness: Federal Firearms 
Legislation, 1919–38, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48, 55 (1981). 
38  ROBERT J. SPITZER, GUN CONTROL: A DOCUMENTARY AND REFERENCE GUIDE 256 (2009). 
39  Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012)). 
40 See Zimring, supra note 28, at 146 (noting that Senator Dodd introduced a bill five days after 
President John F. Kennedy’s assassination that ultimately stalled in the Senate Commerce Committee 
but nevertheless helped set in motion “the forces leading to the adoption of the Gun Control Act of 
1968”).  Lee Harvey Oswald shot President Kennedy using a rifle that was purchased and shipped via 
interstate mail.  OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BATTLE FOR GUN CONTROL 
30 (1998).   
41 Zimring, supra note 28, at 148.   
42 § 102, 82 Stat. at 1216. 
43 Id. § 102, 82 Stat. at 1223. 
44 Id. § 102, 82 Stat. at 1218, 1220. 
45 See David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical and Legal 
Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 595 (1987) (“[T]he early forms of the Gun Control Act were 
drafted with the assistance and encouragement of firearms manufacturers.”). 
46 Zimring, supra note 28, at 145–46. 
47 Hardy, supra note 45, at 596. 
48  Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)). 
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the growing political power of the National Rifle Association (NRA).49  In 
a major revision, the 1986 Act changed the definition of “engaged in the 
business” to mean devoting “time, attention, and labor” to manufacturing 
or selling firearms as “a regular course of trade or business with the 
principal objective of livelihood and profit,”50 thereby limiting the scope of 
the 1968 Act’s application.  In addition, the 1986 Act specifically 
exempted hobbyist traders and those who casually repaired or modified 
firearms.51 
Seven years later, the pendulum apparently swung in the other 
direction when Congress passed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act.52  According to one scholar, it was “this generation’s most important 
federal gun control law . . . and, at the moment of its passage, [was] 
praised . . . as a major turning point in the politics of gun control and crime 
control.”53  Another scholar observed, however, that the limitations of the 
Brady Act were actually modest, seeking: 
[F]irst, to prevent felons, those judged mentally incompetent 
or others otherwise unqualified to own handguns to make 
such a purchase; and second, to provide for a waiting period 
between the time of the purchase and the customer’s actual 
acquisition of a handgun in order to provide a “cooling off” 
period for those who might seek a handgun in a fit of temper 
or rage.54 
The Act also mandated that the waiting period be replaced with a 
national instant background check system within five years,55 although 
portions of the background check provision, which required local law 
enforcement officials to perform certain duties, were invalidated in Printz 
v. United States.56  Moreover, the Act increased the federal licensing fees,57 
resulting in a decrease in the number of licensees by more than 60,000 in a 
year’s time.58  But it is easy to overestimate the significance of this 
                                                                                                                          
49  SPITZER, supra note 38, at 266. 
50  § 101, 100 Stat. at 450 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(A), (C)). 
51 Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C)–(D)). 
52 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–922).   
53  JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK?, at x (2002). 
54  SPITZER, supra note 38, at 276; see also § 102, 107 Stat. at 1538 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 922(d)(4)) (requiring a transferee to state that he or she “has not been adjudicated as a mental 
defective or been committed to a mental institution”); id. § 102, 107 Stat. at 1537 (outlining a five 
business day waiting period). 
55  § 103, 107 Stat. at 1541. 
56 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
57 See § 303, 107 Stat. at 1546 (setting fees at “$200 for 3 years, except that the fee for renewal of 
a valid license shall be $90 for 3 years”). 
58 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-22, GUN CONTROL: IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT 19 (1996). 
 1590 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1581 
number, as this fee increase mostly discouraged individuals “who were not 
really gun dealers, but who got the formerly cheap licenses to obtain 
discounts and other advantages” from obtaining licenses.59 
The following year, Congress passed the Public Safety and 
Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act,60 which banned all assault 
weapons and magazines or ammunition clips holding or easily modified to 
hold more than ten rounds.61  The Act defined assault weapons as specific 
firearms or copies of them, as well as weapons with at least two listed 
features, such as folding stocks, threaded barrels (to which silencers and 
the like can be attached), pistol grips, and bayonet mounts.62  However, it 
specifically exempted possession or transfer of guns already in circulation 
in 1994.63  Most significantly, the Act was allowed to expire in 2004;64 
attempts to revive it have been unsuccessful, even after the Newtown 
shooting.65 
The most recent piece of significant federal firearms legislation, and 
the one most relevant to this Article, is the Protection of Lawful Commerce 
in Arms Act of 2005.66  This Act exempts “manufacturers, distributors, 
dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition . . . [from liability] for the 
harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of [their] products 
by others when the product functioned as designed and intended.”67  The 
Act does allow claims against sellers for negligent entrustment or 
negligence per se,68 and claims against manufacturers for breach of 
warranty,69 design defects,70 or knowingly violating statutory requirements 
related to firearm sales.71  Part of this Act, independently known as the 
Child Safety Lock Act of 2005,72 requires handguns to be sold with a “gun 
storage or safety device”73 and prohibits armor-piercing rounds.74  But this 
                                                                                                                          
59  SPITZER, supra note 38, at 276.  Not surprisingly, those who received NRA campaign 
contributions were statistically more likely to vote against the bill.  Jody Lipford, The Political 
Economy of Gun Control: An Analysis of Senatorial Votes on the 1993 Brady Bill, 12 J. FIREARMS & 
PUB. POL’Y 33, 44–45 (2000). 
60 Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XI, 108 Stat. 1996 (1994). 
61 Id. §§ 110103, 110105, 108 Stat. at 1998–2000. 
62 Id. § 110102(b), 108 Stat at 1997–98. 
63 Id. § 110102(a), 108 Stat at 1997. 
64 Id. § 110105(2), 108 Stat at 2000. 
65 Jonathan Weisman, Gun Control Drive Blocked in Senate, Obama, in Defeat, Sees “Shameful 
Day,” N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1. 
66  Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903, 18 
U.S.C. § 922 (2012)). 
67  15 U.S.C. § 7901(b). 
68  Id. § 7902(5)(A)(ii). 
69  Id. § 7902(5)(A)(iv). 
70  Id. § 7902(5)(A)(v). 
71 Id. § 7902(5)(A)(iii). 
72 Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2099, 2099 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)). 
73  18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(1). 
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legislation was a direct reaction to the litigation discussed in the following 
Subsection, and is not shy about making its attack on these lawsuits 
explicit.  As a result, this Act precludes the types of litigation that would be 
necessary in order for courts to be an effective institution for regulating 
firearm-related externalities. 
2.  Firearm Litigation 
Before discussing firearm litigation, it is necessary to distinguish two 
separate types of injuries caused by guns.  One group of injuries results 
from intentionally violent gun use, of which a large component is suicide.75  
Cases relating to such injuries allege either negligent entrustment against 
gun dealers or harmful marketing and sales practices against gun 
distributors and manufacturers.  The other group of injuries results from 
the misuse—or accidental use—of guns.  Cases relating to these injuries 
involve either straightforward products liability claims against 
manufacturers when guns malfunction, which are often successful,76 or 
design defect claims against manufacturers or distributors.  The marketing 
and design cases have been the focus of the gun litigation controversy.77 
Among the negligent entrustment cases, Gallara v. Koskovich78 is 
typical.   In Gallara, the court held that a sporting goods store that sold 
firearms had a duty to take reasonable measures to ensure that guns would 
not be stolen and subsequently used for criminal activity.79  Notably, the 
court announced that “those who profit from the sale of firearms have a 
special responsibility to the public to adhere to state mandated security 
regulations that require responsible firearm storage in order to prevent 
lethal weapons from winding up in the wrong hands.”80  However, this 
hardly represents a universal position in negligent entrustment claims.81  At 
least some courts do, however, hold distributors liable when they violate 
statutes that prohibit the sale of firearms to certain people, such as the 
clearly mentally impaired or felons whom they know are ineligible to 
                                                                                                                          
74  Id. § 922(a)(7). 
75 See supra note 17 (observing that suicides resulted in the loss of 344,232 years of potential life 
in 2010).  
76 Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction to SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS, supra note 8, at 1, 5. 
77  Id. 
78 836 A.2d 840 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2003).  
79 Id. at 843.  
80  Id. at 851. 
81  See, e.g., Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 948, 950 (Md. 1999) (holding that a 
dealer owed no special duty to a murder victim where there were no “circumstances that increased the 
probability that a thief would steal guns from its retail store and that a third unknown party would 
obtain one of those stolen guns and use it in a criminal manner”). 
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purchase a firearm.82 
In contrast, the marketing and sales/distribution cases proceed on the 
assumption that “one is generally under no duty to prevent even 
foreseeable injuries where the risk of injury arises out of the conduct of a 
third party.”83  We can see this principle animating cases such as 
Grunow v. Valor Corp. of Florida,84 in which a Florida appellate court held 
that Florida law “does not recognize a cause of action for negligent 
distribution of a non-defective firearm.”85  Courts have relaxed this general 
principle, however, where the defendant has a unique ability to control the 
risk.  With respect to gun litigation, the question is whether regulation of 
marketing and sales practices would reduce gun violence, although some 
courts have not analyzed the question in this way.86  
In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,87 a federal district court cited New York law 
to explain that a defendant’s duty is “determined in a given case by 
reference to a variety of factors including reasonableness in the light of 
public risk-shifting policies in a modern economy.”88  Likewise, the court 
noted that New York state courts have “repeatedly emphasized the policy 
oriented nature of the duty determination.”89  It further observed concerns 
about third-party duties of care grounded in the fear of crippling liability 
and the inability of the third-party to prevent the harm.90  But the court 
noted that these concerns could be overcome “where a relationship 
between the defendant and either the plaintiff or the third party wrongdoer 
provides the defendant with the ability to minimize the risk,”91 which the 
court found was present with respect to the manufacturers.92  While on 
appeal to the Second Circuit, the duty of care question was certified to the 
                                                                                                                          
82  See, e.g., Sogo v. Garcia’s Nat’l Gun, Inc., 615 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) 
(finding that the gun purchaser was “within the class intended to be protected by the ordinance” and the 
seller had “knowledge of the . . . ordinance and the risk that it was designed to guard against”); Jones v. 
Williams Pawn & Gun, Inc., 800 So. 2d 267, 271–72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding a pawnshop 
strictly liable for injuries attributable to the violation of a Florida statute prohibiting firearm sales to 
those of “unsound mind”).  
83  Lytton, supra note 76, at 8.  
84 904 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  
85  Id. at 554. 
86  Lytton categorizes these cases either as claims of “oversupply,” “overpromotion,” or “failure to 
supervise retail dealers.”  Id. at 9–11; see also Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 
1064 (N.Y. 2001) (considering oversupply practices of weapons as an answer to reduction of gun 
violence). 
87  62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated sub nom, Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 
F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001). 
88  Id. at 819. 
89  Id. 
90 Id. at 819–20. 
91  Id. at 820. 
92 Id. at 821. 
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New York Court of Appeals,93 which disagreed with the district court’s 
conclusion that the manufacturers were in the best position to prevent the 
harm and accordingly ruled that the manufacturers did not owe the 
plaintiffs a duty of care.94 
In an overpromotion case, Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.,95 a California 
appellate court held that a manufacturer “owed [plaintiffs] a duty to 
exercise reasonable care not to create risks above and beyond those 
inherent in the presence of firearms in our society.”96  The Supreme Court 
of California reversed, however, holding that this sort of suit was 
precluded by statute.97  Subsequently, California’s legislature amended its 
statute to allow these types of suits.98  Courts have also allowed public 
nuisance claims to proceed in overpromotion cases on the theory that 
manufacturers’ and distributors’ sales practices have created a public 
nuisance.99 
The products liability cases proceed on the theory that producers and 
distributors have a general duty to consumers buying their products.100  
Products may be defective either because of manufacturing errors, unsafe 
designs, or inadequate labeling.101  According to the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability: 
                                                                                                                          
93 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2000).  Federal courts sitting in 
diversity, in which they perform the role of state courts, can request that a state court clarify points of 
state law.  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1072 (6th ed. 2009).  
94  Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061–62, 1066 (N.Y. 2001). 
95 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999). 
96 Id. at 152. 
97 Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 119 (Cal. 2001). 
98 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West 2009) (“The design, distribution, or marketing of firearms 
and ammunition is not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill that is required by this 
section.”).  
99 See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1215 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing a district court’s ruling 
that granted a firearms manufacturer’s motion to dismiss a public nuisance claim and reasoning that 
“the distribution and marketing of guns in a way that creates and contributes to a danger to the public 
generally and the plaintiffs in particular” can give rise to a public nuisance claim); James v. Arms 
Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (agreeing with the trial court that it was 
“premature to dismiss the nuisance count in light of the definition of public nuisance” because the 
distributors’ conduct, as pleaded, presented an unreasonable interference with the right of the general 
public and a significant effect on the public); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 
1136, 1141–44 (Ohio 2002) (finding that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded that a gun manufacturer 
“created and maintained a public nuisance by manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling 
firearms in ways that unreasonably interfere[d] with the public health”); see also Jean Macchiaroli 
Eggen & John G. Culhane, Public Nuisance Claims Against Gun Sellers: New Insights and Challenges, 
38 MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 23–37 (2004) (discussing cases that allowed plaintiffs to bring public 
nuisance claims against gun manufacturers).   
100 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998) (“One engaged in the business 
of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to 
liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”). 
101 Id. § 2. 
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A product: (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the 
product departs from its intended design even though all 
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing 
of the product; (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced 
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design 
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; (c) 
is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of 
reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other 
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings 
renders the product not reasonably safe.102 
So, for example, in Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,103 the Supreme 
Court of Ohio held that a plaintiff could bring a failure-to-warn claim 
because the risk that a gun could hold a bullet in its chamber even without 
a magazine installed was not “open and obvious.”104   
While products liability cases alleging a failure to warn have been 
successful, the argument that manufacturers should be held strictly liable 
because the manufacture, distribution, and sale of firearms is an 
abnormally dangerous activity has been largely rejected.105  One 
exceptional case imposed strict liability on manufacturers of a “Saturday 
Night Special,” which are often defined as “small, cheap handgun[s] used 
in criminal activity.”106  However, in a show of the strength of the industry 
lobby, the Maryland legislature overturned the rule of strict liability for 
such manufacturers and created a review board that would regulate 
handguns likely to be used in criminal activities.107 
                                                                                                                          
102 Id. 
103 768 N.E.2d 1136.  
104 Id. at 1147. 
105 Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability Is Dead, Long 
Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 777 (1994). 
106 Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153 n.8 (Md. 1985), superseded by statute, MD. 
CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-402 (West 2013), as recognized in Copier ex rel. Lindsey v. Smith & 
Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 836 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998).  One study found that banning “Saturday Night 
Specials” in Maryland reduced the firearm homicide rate by around eleven percent.  Daniel W. 
Webster, Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, Effects of Maryland’s Law Banning “Saturday Night 
Special” Handguns on Homicides, 155 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 406, 409 (2002). 
107 MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-402, 5-404.  The manufacturer nevertheless stopped 
selling the gun that was the subject of the litigation, showing that the litigation had at least some 
regulatory effect.  See Lytton, supra note 76, at 6 (recognizing that as a result of courts imposing strict 
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The unsafe design cases proceed either by performing risk-utility 
analyses or by arguing that the manufacturers should be liable because 
there are reasonable alternative designs, but these claims have been 
unsuccessful.108 
The only significant win in the firearms litigation came in 2000, when 
Smith & Wesson agreed to settle suits with the federal government, New 
York, Connecticut, and a number of municipal governments.109  The 
company vowed to change its distribution practices and make its firearm 
designs safer by ensuring, for example, that they will not accidentally 
discharge when dropped and that children under the age of six cannot fire 
them.110  This result was significant because it “undercut the gun industry’s 
traditional position that gun manufacturers have neither the ability nor the 
responsibility to design guns to reduce the risk of misuse.”111  However, 
due to a change in federal administrations and backlash from the industry 
and the NRA, the settlement deal unraveled—with the result that only one 
city, Boston, actually resolved its suit with Smith & Wesson.112 
On the whole, this litigation has had a limited effect on manufacturer 
and distributor behavior.  One major exception has been Colt, which 
changed its business practices by discontinuing certain product lines and 
selling more to police departments and the military.113  Colt felt that these 
changes were necessary in light of the gun litigation, which made it 
difficult for the company to secure loans given the potential for such 
lawsuits to bankrupt the company.114  In 2002, Colt Defense split off from 
Colt Manufacturing, with the former being expected to cater to the 
government market.115  (As of 2013, these sister companies were 
                                                                                                                          
liability on manufacturers in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, they “ceased production and sale of Saturday 
Night Specials”). 
108 See, e.g., Matthews v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 641 F.3d 635, 641 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, a reasonable alternative design argument is only 
relevant if the user was performing a reasonably anticipated use of the product); Dix v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., No. A093082, 2002 WL 187397, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002) (explaining that the jury in 
the lower court returned a verdict in favor of the gun manufacturer under a risk-utility analysis because 
the gun was not defective “as a result of a risk in its design that outweigh[ed] the benefits of that 
design”); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1158–59 (Md. 2002) (choosing to apply the 
consumer expectation test over a risk-utility test and finding no cause of action in the case). 
109 Dennis A. Henigan, Smith & Wesson Settlement Agreement, in 1 GUNS IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND THE LAW 542 (Gregg Lee Carter 
ed., 2002). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Cf. Schuck, supra note 8, at 240 (attributing Smith & Wesson’s decision not to go through 
with the settlement agreements to the belief that it was “literally fighting for its economic life and must 
resist compliance as strenuously and resourcefully as it can”). 
113 Mike Allen, Colt’s to Curtail Sale of Handguns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999, at A1. 
114 Id. 
115 Colt Makers Reunited in $60.5M Merger, HARTFORDBUSINESS.COM (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/ARTICLE/20130716/NEWS01/130719947.  It is worth noting that 
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rejoined.)116  Similarly, litigation or the threat of litigation led several 
smaller gun companies to seek bankruptcy protection in the mid- to late-
1990s.  For example, Lorcin Engineering, a manufacturer of “Saturday 
Night Specials,” declared bankruptcy in 1996 and went out of business in 
1999,117 and both Davis Industries and Sundance Industries filed for 
bankruptcy protection in 1999.118  
Thus far, then, efforts by both legislatures and litigants to regulate 
firearms have been largely ineffective.  Since the main regulatory problems 
associated with firearms are largely unaddressed, it is worth considering 
how we might optimize the institutional arrangements for regulating these 
problems, so that future efforts can be appropriately channeled.  The 
remainder of the Article addresses this issue. 
III.  COMPARING INSTITUTIONS  
This Part supports the claim that courts are institutionally better at 
regulatory policymaking in the realm of firearms when compared to the 
elected branches of government.  Peter Schuck has suggested six factors to 
evaluate the regulatory effectiveness of the courts in firearm litigation 
compared to the elected branches’ responses to the social problems 
firearms create.119  Schuck argues that elected branches are more effective 
and legitimate than the courts; in contrast, I argue that both in theory and in 
the context of the firearm litigation, it is actually the courts that are 
superior on both counts. 
First, effective policymaking institutions must be capable of producing 
or procuring the necessary technocratic information.  Indeed, according to 
Schuck, “[a] legal system’s ability to mobilize high-quality policy-relevant 
facts for the lawmakers at a relatively low cost is perhaps the most 
                                                                                                                          
gun litigation was only one factor contributing to Colt’s distress in the time leading up to the 2002 split.  
Calls for a grassroots boycott of Colt began in 1998 when then-CEO Ron Stewart committed the 
outrageous sin of admitting that greater gun regulation might be inevitable.  Henry Goldman, Colt’s 
Chief Stands Up For Federal Control, PHIL. INQUIRER (July 13, 1998), http://articles.philly.com/1998-
07-13/news/25738137_1_gun-control-proposals-gun-control-federal-gun.  
116 Colt Makers Reunited in $60.5M Merger, supra note 115.  
117 Sharon Walsh, Insurers Are Bailing Out on Gun Industry, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1999, at A1. 
118 Paul M. Barrett, Some Small California Gun Firms File Under Bankruptcy Code as Cities Sue, 
WALL. ST. J., Sept. 13, 1999, at B10.  Many of these companies were spinoffs of Raven Arms.  Bob 
Port, Prepare to Meet Thy Gunmaker, New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17, 2002, at 34; Hot Guns: 
Ring of Fire “Families,” FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/guns/ring/famili
es.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). 
119 See Schuck, supra note 8, at 230 (“In order for an institution to make and implement policy 
effectively, it must (1) generate the technocratic information needed for gun-related policy-making; (2) 
generate the political information needed to frame an acceptable policy; (3) mobilize the array of 
different policy instruments necessary to establish and implement the policy; (4) promote social 
learning (short feedback loops) and flexible adaptation to new conditions; (5) generate predictable 
rules; and (6) secure and sustain the policy’s legitimacy.”). 
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important precondition for the effectiveness of its policies.”120  While the 
statutory and rulemaking procedure in the elected branches are 
theoretically designed to allow widespread democratic input, procedural 
rules limit the availability of certain types of information in the courts.  A 
first step, therefore, in determining the informational basis of decision 
making has to take into account the procedural rules governing the 
decision-making process.  In addition to the theoretical capacity for an 
institution to produce information, it is also important to consider whether 
the incentive structure of the participants is designed to bring forward the 
respective information. 
Agencies are often touted for their ability to generate information.121  
The statutory and rulemaking procedures available to the elected branches 
allow widespread democratic input; theoretically, anyone can offer their 
opinion to legislators and administrative agencies,122 which should lead to 
agencies having more and better information.  In contrast, procedural rules 
limit the availability of certain types of information in the courts, as well as 
who may contribute that information.123  These two institutions also have 
different incentive structures for participants to bring forward the 
respective information.  Whereas in the process of elected branch 
policymaking all interested parties are presumed to be motivated to 
volunteer their knowledge to influence the regulatory outcome, the judicial 
process can disincentivize the dissemination of information.124  Yet the 
potentially large damages awards create an incentive for attorneys to 
produce and share technocratic information; even if a defendant party lacks 
the incentive to produce potentially damaging information, plaintiffs do 
have that incentive. 
More importantly, this is only true for regulatory problems that are 
technocratic.  One way to limit firearms-related social costs is through 
command-and-control regulation that requires particular designs, 
                                                                                                                          
120 Id. at 231. 
121 See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 
95 GEO. L.J. 693, 696 (2007) (“Contemporary analysts generally take for granted the ‘fact’ that 
regulatory agencies enjoy far greater access to information . . . than their judicial counterparts.”); see 
also Schuck, supra note 8, at 232 (discussing which institutions are best equipped to minimize 
informational deficits in regards to specific policy problems). 
122 In cases of informal rulemaking, § 553(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act allows 
“interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, 
views, or arguments.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).  In the rare instances of formal rulemaking, § 556(d) 
provides the opportunity to submit one’s views.  Id. § 556(d).  
123 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29 (restricting the participation of non-state amici curiae); FED. R. 
EVID. 402 (excluding irrelevant evidence); FED. R. EVID. 802 (excluding hearsay evidence); Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (discussing constitutional standing requirements); 
cf. Schuck, supra note 8, at 233 (“[D]iscovery can be notoriously aggressive and intrusive . . . [b]ut this 
access to existing files hardly translates into providing the decision maker . . . with the kind of 
information she would want . . . .”). 
124 Schuck, supra note 8, at 233–34. 
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distribution patterns, and the like.  But the damages-based solution 
proposed in Part IV obviates the need for regulators to generate such 
information because the market would be incentivized to create this 
information itself.  As a result, it is court-based regulation that will in fact 
produce the relevant information on such things as optimal safety designs. 
Second, effective policymaking requires “political information needed 
to frame an acceptable policy.”125  This includes data such as voter 
preferences and their intensity, levels of support and opposition for 
particular policies among both policymakers and those affected by them, 
and potential media reactions to policies.126  Surely, Schuck correctly 
identifies the importance of voter preferences and, to a point, the intensity 
of such preferences.  But much of the political information Schuck sees as 
relevant—for example, potential reactions of lobbyists and the ability to 
sway vital political actors—is only important when the policymaking 
process is, for lack of a better term, political.  Democratic support is an 
important tool to measure the legitimacy and effectiveness of regulation.  
Thus, the statutory process was originally seen as suitable to determine the 
politically most-supported outcome.  However, the increasing number of 
veto gates as well as political horse-trading and private-interest capture 
undermine the causal connection between public support and legislative 
outcome.127  These political realities influence the regulatory decisions 
made by the elected branches.  Policymaking in the courts is advantageous 
in part precisely because the forum allows policymaking to take place 
without political obstruction.  Additionally, while Schuck is correct that 
interest groups can often present at least a crude picture of voter 
preferences and preference intensity, this is not empirically correct within 
the realm of firearm regulation.  For example, studies repeatedly show that 
the NRA, which dominates the political landscape of firearm regulation, 
rarely represents the policy preferences of its members.128  In addition, as 
with the previous factors, the market-based regulatory solution this Article 
recommends creates a system in which preferences are revealed through 
market behavior. 
Third, Schuck argues that effective policymaking also requires 
                                                                                                                          
125 Id. at 230. 
126 Id. at 236. 
127 Tanya Bagashka, Unpacking Corruption: The Effect of Veto Players on State Capture and 
Bureaucratic Corruption, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1–3 (2013). 
128 See, e.g., Colleen L. Barry et al., After Newtown—Public Opinion on Gun Policy and Mental 
Illness, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1077, 1077 (2013) (finding 74% of NRA members favor universal 
background checks); Michael Cooper & Dalia Sussman, Massacre Sways Public in Way Others Did 
Not, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2013, at A16 (finding 85% of households containing an NRA member favor 
universal background checks for gun purchasers); see also David Kairys, Self-Defense and Gun 
Regulation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1669, 1682 (2013) (hypothesizing that Americans support the NRA 
despite favoring many regulations opposed by the NRA solely because the NRA supports and protects 
gun ownership).   
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regulators to have a variety of means through which they can “create and 
shape the incentives necessary to secure compliance.”129  The fact that 
courts “possess few instruments for securing compliance, and they tend to 
be weak, inflexible, or both,” he asserts, makes them comparatively poor 
policymakers.130  As Schuck himself admits, however, the “damage 
remedy . . . is often perfectly adequate for the purpose of inducing 
defendants’ straightforward compliance,” although this power can be 
limited when the target of the suit is a relatively small-scale manufacturer 
or distributor.131  Thus, compared to the elected branches, courts may be 
limited as a general matter.  Nevertheless, courts are sufficiently able to 
react flexibly and effectively in the face of firearm-related risk-regulatory 
challenges.  While court-based remedies may lack flexibility in the face of 
changed circumstances, this is only an issue when the regulatory problem 
and legal standards need flexibility.  Changes in technology and scientific 
knowledge warrant flexibility with respect to standard-setting in 
environmental regulation, for example.  In contrast, it does not appear that 
the types of regulations commonly discussed in firearm litigation, such as 
changes in distribution practices or design changes, warrant the same level 
of flexibility.  Should modification of a particular remedy be warranted, 
moreover, parties have the ability to petition the court and explain why the 
remedy is unexpectedly onerous or why new information shows the 
remedy to be unavailing or perverse.132  Likewise, court remedies may not 
have the industry-wide effect that an agency-based approach can have.  But 
to criticize courts on such a basis is to compare apples to oranges; to do so 
is akin to saying that an individual enforcement action by an administrative 
agency does not have systemic effect.  Importantly, the series of lawsuits 
constitutes a system of regulatory governance just as a series of 
enforcement actions by an administrative agency would.  Additionally, this 
ignores the potential of multiparty litigation and the extent to which 
litigation against the industry leaders can have industry-wide or at least 
substantial effects.133  Finally, to reiterate, the market-based effects of 
social-cost internalization would be systemic. 
Fourth, Schuck argues that “[p]erhaps no resource is more essential to 
                                                                                                                          
129 Schuck, supra note 8, at 238. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 239. 
132 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (outlining the circumstances when a court may relieve a party 
or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding). 
133 Three brands—Sturm, Ruger & Co.; Smith & Wesson; and Remington—account for forty-one 
percent of domestic firearm sales in the United States.  Jurgen Brauer, The U.S. Firearms Industry: 
Production and Supply 12 (Small Arms Survey, Working Paper No. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP14-US-Firearms-
Industry.pdf.  In 2012, the top eight brands manufactured around seventy percent of the nation’s pistols 
and rifles and nearly one hundred percent of the nation’s revolvers and shotguns.  Id. at 50 fig.7. 
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a society’s policy wisdom than its capacity to learn and to adapt swiftly 
and creatively to changing conditions.”134  This observation is susceptible 
to the same observations as his third argument; that is, flexibility is only 
useful for policy problems warranting flexible solutions, such as those 
made upon in the face of scientific uncertainty.  Such flexibility can be 
achieved through price changes made by manufacturers and distributors. 
Fifth, Schuck notes the importance of predictability.135  This criterion 
is assailable on two counts.  First, it has the potential to prove too much.  If 
“[t]ort rules are much less determinate and transparent than regulations, 
other things being equal,”136 and the question is always one of comparison 
with administrative agencies, then it is not clear that tort law is valuable at 
all, which surely must be false.  More importantly, this line of argument 
makes predictability an end in itself, which is also problematic.  The 
substantive result is much more important—a stable and predictable policy 
that clearly under-deters wrongful conduct seems inferior to an unstable 
one that optimally deters.  Additionally, predictability is at odds with the 
flexibility that Schuck also extols.137  Policies that take account of changed 
circumstances, variable social attitudes, or additional information are 
unpredictable.  The substantive result we should expect from a system that 
accounts for changed circumstances is modified legal obligations. 
Nevertheless, a system that is too unpredictable is surely undesirable, and 
perhaps incremental change is the preferred outcome. 
I have discussed Schuck’s final criterion—the institution’s ability to 
“secure and sustain the policy’s legitimacy”—in a previous work.138  It is 
precisely the systemically skewed policymaking system of the elected 
branches (especially the legislature) that makes the courts superior 
policymakers with respect to legitimacy.  On the basis of these 
observations, it seems that the courts are generally the best institution for 
regulating firearm-related social costs.  As a result, courts, rather than 
legislatures and agencies, are the preferred institution for dealing with the 
regulatory problems this Article discusses.  This conclusion is further 
bolstered by the market-driven system of regulation I suggest in the 
following Part. 
IV.  OPTIMAL INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO FIREARM REGULATION 
We have seen that the main regulatory problems for firearms are 
social-cost externalities.  Courts are better at dealing with these problems 
                                                                                                                          
134 Schuck, supra note 8, at 241. 
135 Id. at 242. 
136 Id. at 243. 
137 See id. at 238 (describing current inflexibility involved in judges’ recourse in tort cases). 
138 See Luff, supra note 5, at 553–54 (comparing the stability of the judiciary with the legislature 
while describing both as relatively secure entities). 
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than the elected branches because they have been more successful at 
generating technocratic information, and because these regulatory 
problems could be dealt with adequately through the courts’ ability to grant 
injunctions and damages awards.  Courts are also able to act freely, without 
the need for congressional delegations of power—which are often denied 
because of the NRA’s influence in the legislative process.139  This Part 
focuses on three possible ways of dealing with the social costs of firearms: 
(1) taxation; (2) compensation funds; and (3) individual or enterprise 
liability.  A brief final Section then discusses the role that legislature and 
agencies should play in regulating firearm-related injuries. 
A.  The Case for Market-Based Regulation of Firearms 
In a market-based regulation regime, the costs or potential costs of 
litigation are charged to the firearms manufacturers, which distribute the 
costs among themselves, distributors, and the purchasers.140  These market 
effects will, in turn, have behavioral effects on manufacturers and 
distributors.  First, all other things being equal, more dangerous products 
will produce greater social costs, which will be charged back to the 
manufacturers through litigation.141  This will cause the price of the 
product to better reflect its risk and also discourage people from buying 
this now more expensive product.  As a result, forcing manufacturers to 
internalize the social costs of their products will deter consumers from 
purchasing dangerous products.  Second, this process means that more 
dangerous products will be at a market disadvantage, which will create an 
incentive for the manufacturers to design safer products, as well as to 
compete to find optimally safe designs.142 
In the case of firearms distribution, if particular distributors and stores 
sell those guns that account for a large amount of social costs, the 
manufacturers, distributors, and stores have incentives to change their 
distribution practices.  Specifically, the manufacturers will have an 
                                                                                                                          
139 See Bruce Rogers, NRA Winning the Influence Battle Over Gun Control, FORBES                 
(Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucerogers/2013/02/01/nra-winning-the-influence-battle-
over-gun-control/ (analyzing the success of NRA’s influence upon legislation).  The NRA has even 
used its political influence to convince Congress not to fund research into the causes and prevention of 
gun violence.  Andrew Jay McClurg, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: Rejecting the 
“Wouldn’t You Want a Gun If Attacked?” Argument, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1773, 1798 (2013) 
140 See Jon S. Vernick et al., Availability of Litigation as a Public Health Tool for Firearm Injury 
Prevention: Comparison of Guns, Vaccines and Motor Vehicles, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1991, 1996 
(2007) (stating that most industries pass the costs of the threat of litigation onto consumers and it would 
be a reasonable response by firearm industry). 
141 See Jon S. Vernick et al., Role of Litigation in Preventing Product-Related Injuries, 25 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 90, 90 (2003) (describing how process of litigation transfers the costs of injuries 
onto entities that could have prevented injuries). 
142 See id. at 90–91 (discussing the impact discovery and publicity related to litigation can have in 
producing product modifications). 
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incentive not to supply particular distributors, and the distributors will have 
an incentive not to supply particular stores.  Moreover, this will give the 
manufacturers and distributors the incentive to produce information 
evaluating which stores account for larger amounts of social costs so that 
they can take corrective action. 
Social-cost internalization would also create an incentive for both 
manufacturers and consumers to support such programs as national 
mandatory background checks—to which they (and the NRA) have 
traditionally been opposed—as background checks are likely to reduce 
social costs.143  Background checks are intended to weed out purchasers 
who are likely to misuse firearms from the market, with a particular focus 
on potential purchasers with violent tendencies.  Preventing these 
purchasers from buying firearms is not currently in manufacturers’, 
distributors’, or stores’ interests because they bear few or no costs when 
their products are misused.144  If they bore these costs, however, they 
would have the incentive to support background checks, since the checks 
could reasonably be expected to reduce social costs.  Finally, social cost 
internalization would lead to support for changes in the sales practices at 
gun shows and on the Internet, which currently represent a big gap in the 
national background check system.  That is, manufacturers would have the 
incentive to ensure their guns are being sold to responsible individuals.145  
As a result, social-cost internalization would create market incentives 
leading not just to a decreased public burden represented by the social 
costs of firearms, but also to safer firearm designs and distribution 
practices.  The remainder of this Part discusses how best to achieve this 
internalization. 
B.  Means of Market-Based Regulation 
1.  Ex Ante Taxation 
One possible means of dealing with the social costs of firearms is 
                                                                                                                          
143 See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Principles for Effective Gun Policy, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
589, 594–95 (2004) (asserting gun possession by criminals poses higher social costs and that 
background checks minimize those costs).  
144 See supra text accompanying notes 66–67.  Manufacturers, distributors, and stores only bear 
costs to the extent that they are emotionally upset by their products’ misuse, or when they suffer 
negative media attention and consumer disapproval—the latter of which is questionable—as a result of 
their products’ misuse.  See Wayne Drash, At Colt’s Connecticut Factory, No Apologies for Arming 
America, CNN (June 8, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/08/us/colt-factory-gun-debate/ (describing 
various public reactions as well as a gun manufacturer’s reaction to the Newtown shooting). 
145 One residual problem is used firearms, the sales of which will not reflect their social costs 
under this model.  One possibility is to implement an enterprise liability system, infra Part IV.B.3, 
which would apportion costs to manufactures based on their market share.  Since there are thousands of 
firearms dealers, however, a modified version of enterprise liability might exempt manufacturers that 
fall below some threshold of sales or number of firearms sold—a number obtainable from ATF records. 
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through taxation.146  As we have seen, some amount of firearms taxation 
has been present for nearly a century at the federal level.147  Taxation as a 
means of dealing with firearm-related costs seems promising initially.  It 
would be easy to collect—taxes can simply be charged on a per-unit basis, 
and collected at the point of sale.  But taxation as a means of remedying 
social costs is ineffective for a number of reasons.  First, taxation is 
relatively inflexible.  If taxes are intended to remedy social costs, tax rates 
must be responsive to changes in these costs.  These costs will change over 
time based on a variety of factors, such as the costs and effectiveness of 
medical care and differences in the prevalence of firearm-related violence 
and accidents.148  Such changes require legislation that can range from 
difficult to impossible to enact.  As discussed in the previous Parts, the 
legislature has been susceptible to capture in regulating firearms, and tax 
increases—especially for firearms—will inevitably face strong opposition.  
Difficulty in changing tax-related legislation means that firearm taxes 
would rarely, if ever, reflect the actual social costs of firearm ownership. 
2.  Administrative Compensation Systems 
Another means of dealing with firearm-related externalities is to create 
a compensation system run by an administrative agency.  Although such 
systems are generally thought of as insurance schemes, the effect of such 
systems can be to force producers to internalize the costs of some 
activities.149  For example, the Black Lung Benefits Act150 allows coal 
miners affected by pneumoconiosis and their families to receive disability 
benefits as well as payment for their medical costs.151  Similarly, the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act152 provides similar 
benefits for workers injured in the course of maritime employment.153  As a 
means of forcing social-cost internalization, an administrative 
compensation system would function quite well.154  But such a system is 
                                                                                                                          
146 See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
147 See supra text accompanying note 32. 
148 The current tax rate would have to estimate a future social cost. 
149 In fact, the Black Lung Benefits Act uses precisely this language in authorizing the creation of 
an insurance system for coal mine operators.  30 U.S.C. § 943 (2012). 
150 Id. §§ 901–944. 
151 See id. § 932(a) (requiring operators to compensate any employee due to death or total 
disability from pneumoconiosis arising from employment within a mine if not covered by state 
workmen’s compensation). 
152 33 U.S.C. § 901–950 (2012). 
153 Id. § 903(a).  
154 As Hanson and Logue observe, however, such a system would produce a variety of other costs 
that are beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of 
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1283–86 
(1998) (describing the potential costs of an administrative compensation system for social costs 
associated with smoking). 
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unlikely as a political matter for a number of reasons.  Legislation would 
be required to establish the compensation system, which seems improbable 
in the current political climate.  Moreover, another powerful lobbying 
group, the plaintiff’s bar, would foreseeably oppose an administrative 
system.  Thus, although promising in theory, dealing with the social costs 
of firearm injuries through an administrative compensation scheme is 
institutionally inferior to a court-based solution because the former lacks a 
necessary condition for regulation—the power to act. 
3.  Liability  
Another means of dealing with the social costs of firearms is individual 
or enterprise liability.  In an enterprise liability scheme, those claiming 
harm from firearms—including consumers—would obtain damages for 
their injuries, which would be apportioned among firearm manufacturers 
based on their pro-rata share of the market.155  Since manufacturers would 
presumably transfer some or most of the costs of liability to consumers by 
increasing prices, enterprise liability would have the effect of an ex post 
exercise tax scheme (or, from the perspective of firearms purchasers, an 
ex-ante insurance scheme).156  In fact, by claiming restitution based on the 
public nuisance costs of firearm violence, the municipalities sought a legal 
remedy that had the effect of forcing the industry to internalize the costs of 
their commercial activities.  Firearm use creates costs—healthcare needs 
and public-safety costs—that are not borne by the firearm’s producer or 
consumer.157  A damage payment would force the producer to bear that 
cost, rather than a third party (i.e., the state or individual taxpayers).  
The main advantage of a liability scheme is that it is unaffected by 
many of the information problems that attend ex ante taxation.  Such a 
system does not depend on ex ante information about the social costs of 
firearms; rather, it charges these costs to the firearm industry as they occur.  
Likewise, it is much more flexible than an ex ante system.  When parties 
are directly or indirectly injured by firearms, they sue the firearm 
companies, thereby internalizing the social costs of firearms.  The 
companies themselves can then decide how to apportion those costs 
between themselves and consumers by altering prices as necessary, 
creating a system that would work more fluidly than one in which a 
legislature would have to predict the costs of harms ex ante. 
This is not to say, however, that a litigation-based regulatory scheme 
would be perfect.  First, juries may be unable to accurately determine the 
                                                                                                                          
155 This idea was explored admirably by Hanson and Logue.  Id. at 1282–83. 
156 See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance 
Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 540 (1984) (outlining the process by which cost of risk is spread to 
consumers). 
157 See supra notes 18–19, 23 and accompanying text. 
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total social costs in particular cases.  As is often the case with toxic torts 
and workplace exposure cases, there will always be questions of specific 
causation, even if general causation is established.158  Not only will juries 
and judges draw incorrect conclusions about causation, they will also 
invariably make mistakes about monetary and nonmonetary harms.  For 
example, individual claims for lost wages and nonmonetary damages will 
likely be more difficult to measure.159  Furthermore, the availability of 
nonmonetary damages will create an incentive to overstate them.   
Second, not all who are entitled to recover would do so.  Lack of 
knowledge about the availability of compensation, or simply not wanting 
to trouble oneself with litigation, would prevent at least some proportion of 
those entitled to recoveries from obtaining them.160  Moreover, recovery 
for some types of social costs—for example, the nonmonetary emotional 
costs associated with firearm-related injuries—would require a major 
change in the laws of most states.161   
Third, the enforcement of a liability system would not be cost-free.  
The state would face increased administrative costs associated with 
providing a forum to hear the increased number of firearms-related claims, 
and both the firearm companies and plaintiffs would have to hire lawyers.  
From the standpoint of cost-internalization, the fees of plaintiffs’ attorneys 
would not have an effect, since cost-internalization only requires that 
companies pay.162  The costs of defendants’ attorneys, however, would be 
relevant, since these costs will also be apportioned between companies and 
                                                                                                                          
158 See, e.g., Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, 
and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 376–77 (1986) (“Proving the cause of injuries that remain 
latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and occur at background levels even without 
any apparent cause, is the ‘central problem’ for toxic tort plaintiffs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
159 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the 
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006) 
(noting the difficultly of measuring such damages); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb 
in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 908 (1989) (noting the difficultly of 
measuring such damages); Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the 
Calculation of Compensatory Damages, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S217, S218 (2008) (noting the difficulty of 
measuring such damages). 
160 See William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 837, 837–38 (1995) (describing the obstacles that mass tort litigation encounters 
including lack of awareness of potential claimants). 
161 Few states currently allow for recovery in cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
which would presumably be the cause of action used to recover the nonmonetary social costs discussed 
here.  See Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reducing Estate and Trust Litigation Through Disclosure, in 
Terrorem Clauses, Mediation and Arbitration, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 237, 237 (2008) 
(noting that “[p]ure hurt feelings . . . generally go uncompensated” and that “[i]n severe cases, a cause 
for action for . . . negligent infliction of emotional distress might arise but such cases are rare”).  In 
contrast, liability for monetary costs of firearms merely requires application of ubiquitous tort 
doctrines. 
162 Naturally, if the regulatory goal was compensation, the effect of attorneys’ fees on plaintiff 
recoveries would be relevant. 
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consumers.  This itself is a cost and, to the extent that there is an optimal 
level of firearm consumption, the increased cost of firearms as a result of 
attorneys’ fees paid by defendants will reduce demand to some suboptimal 
level.  
Yet another concern with liability is double recovery.  In a world 
where individuals, insurers, and governments can all sue to recover 
firearm-related costs, it will be necessary to determine who is able to 
recover what costs.  Perhaps most prominently, in order to avoid double 
recovery, it would be necessary to modify the collateral source rule, which 
generally bars defendants from introducing evidence that a plaintiff’s 
injuries have been or will be covered by insurance.163  Note, however, that 
from the perspective of social costs, the issue of double recovery only 
becomes an issue once the total aggregate recoveries by all plaintiffs 
(including individuals and insurers suing for the same injuries) reaches the 
total amount of social cost of firearms.164  
Despite these problems, however, litigation-based regulation seems to 
be the most promising approach to firearm-related externalities.  Because 
they avoid the information, flexibility, and potential constitutional 
problems of command-and-control regulation, agency intervention, or 
Pigouvian taxation, while generating benefits unique to courts as an 
institution, litigation is therefore the best means of correcting these 
externalities. 
C.  The Complementary Role of the Elected Branches 
Although courts should take the lead in dealing with the social costs of 
firearms, the elected branches still have a role to play in firearm regulation.  
Although this Article has focused on the correction of market failures, and 
particularly externalities, the elected branches are in a better position to 
prevent those externalities from occurring in the first place by discouraging 
misuse of firearms.  Legislators and administrative agencies should 
continue to explore ways to decrease firearm related violence and ways to 
design firearms to limit accidental discharge.  Since this is the type of issue 
for which new information will continually be generated, flexible 
responses will be vital, as will a variety of regulatory tools, suggesting that 
                                                                                                                          
163 David Schap & Andrew Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule: Statutory Reform and Special 
Interests, 28 CATO J. 83, 84 (2008). 
164 Enterprise liability could raise a special problem—it might disincentivize companies from 
producing safer products.  If the liability system only charged companies the costs caused by their 
products, those companies would at least have some incentive to determine whether safer firearm 
designs exist.  Naturally, the companies might still decide that the costs of producing safer products—
assuming such products are possible—outweigh the reductions in tort liability and any market benefits 
such products might cause.  But assuming riskier products cost less to produce, enterprise liability 
might also create a prisoners’ dilemma among producers in which each producer has an incentive to 
make their products less safe. 
 2014] REGULATING FIREARMS THROUGH LITIGATION 1607 
legislatures and administrative agencies are the preferred institution to deal 
with deterrence-based regulation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has advocated a means of regulating firearms that strays 
from the traditional path.  Normally, firearm regulation is envisioned as 
command-and-control devices that dictate particular designs or limit access 
to firearms for some portion of the population.  Similarly, firearm litigation 
is not often discussed in terms of its regulatory effects, much less its ability 
to force firearms manufacturers, suppliers, and purchasers to internalize the 
negative externalities of firearms.  This Article will hopefully induce 
readers to think about firearm regulation—and firearm litigation—in a 
different way.  While admittedly no single regulatory tool is without its 
attendant costs, social cost internalization through litigation is the optimal 
tool for dealing with the main regulatory problems that firearms present.  
At present, however, such a solution is preempted by the Protection of 
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.165  Since litigation would be an effective 
method of regulating firearms in a manner consistent with their social 
costs, the prohibition of this litigation represents a lost opportunity, 
suggesting the Act ought to be repealed.  
                                                                                                                          
165 See supra text accompanying notes 66–67. 
